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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of the Estate
of
Case No. 930291-CA
DONALD CHAD HUSBAND
Deceased.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction

in this

matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.
Whether the Conder & Wangsgard claim for attorney's
fees in the sum of $37,820.81 was legally sufficient under Utah
Code Ann. §75-3-804 and timely presented to the Personal Representative in compliance ^ith Utah Code Ann. §75-3-803.
This is an issue involving a question of law which
should

be

reviewed

for

deference to said ruling.
5 (1992) .

its

correctness

with

no

particular

Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm., 198 UAR

Any findings of fact upon which the said conclusions

of law is based is to be determined by the clearly erroneous
standard.

State v. Stercrer. 155 UAR 30 (1992).
II.
Whether the Court erred in allowing the re-redirect

examination of Personal Representative Conder at the June 14,
1991 hearing.

This is an issue involving the mode and order of interrogation under Rule 611, Utah Rules of Evidence, and is reviewed
on an abuse of discretion standard.

State v. Holmes, 495 P. 2d

312 (1972).
III.
Whether

the

Court

erred

in

determining

that

only

$5,000.00 instead of $11,550.00 in attorney's fees were incurred
in prosecuting the claim of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's
fees in the sum of $37,820.81.
This is an issue involving a question of law which
should be reviewed for its correctness with no particular deference to said ruling.
(1992).
law

Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm. , 198 UAR 5

Any findings of facts upon which the said conclusion of

is based

standard.

is to be determined

by the clearly

erroneous

State v. Stercrer, 155 UAR 30 (1992) .
IV.
Whether the Court erred in failing to surcharge Per-

sonal Representative Conder for the interest not earned by his
failure to deposit estate funds in an interest bearing account.
This is an issue involving a question of law which
should be reviewed for its correctness with no particular deference to said ruling.
(1992) .

Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm. , 198 UAR 5

Any findings of fact upon which the said conclusion of

law is based is to be determined by the clearly erroneous standard.

State v. Sterger, 155 UAR 30 (1992).

2

CONSTITUTION. STATUTORY AND RULE CONSTRUCTION
THOUGHT TO BE DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES
Utah Code Ann. Sections 75-3-803 and 804,
Rule 611(a), Utah Rules of Evidence
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ethyl Ashworth and Karen E. Husband, ex-wives of decedent and the parents and natural guardians, respectively, of
Dylon C. Husband and Lindsey Husband, filed a petition for the
minor children and heirs of Decedent for the informal appointment
of Jerrald

D. Conder as Personal Representative

and

for the

informal probate of the intestate estate of Donald Chad Husband.
(R.2-6)

After approximately three months, Ethyl Ashworth, for

Appellant, filed a petition to remove Jerrald D. Conder as Personal Representative for, among other things, the large claim for
attorney's fees by Conder & Wangsgard incurred by Decedent prior
to his death.

(R.23-28)

A hearing on the Petition to Remove was

held on January 15, 1991 during the course of which a Stipulation
was entered into relating to the handling of the case thereafter
including the claim of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's fees
incurred by Decedent prior to his death.
& Wangsgard

(R.184,• 190-194)

Conder

filed a Petition to Approve Claim in the sum of

$33,248.75 for attorney's fees incurred by Decedent prior to his
death together with interest thereon in the sum of $4,572.06 for
a total claim of $37,820.81.

(R.250-252)

Appellant filed a

Response to Petition for Attorney's Fees (R. 269-272) and a Memorandum and an Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for
Approval

of Claim for Attorney's Fees.

3

(R.309-332;388-394)

Thereafter, an evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of the
claim of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's fees on June 14, 1991
(R.275;936-1059) and arguments of counsel were heard on July 29,
1991 (R.325), November 25, 1991 (R.366;1234-1406) , and on January
21, 1992 (R.429;1307-1333) which resulted in Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 7, 1992, wherein
Conder

&

Wangsgard

(R.431-438)

was

awarded

$34,038.81

on

their

claim.

Co-Personal Representatives filed a Petition for

Approval of Final Settlement and Distribution (R.439-443) together with a Schedule of Distribution and a Stipulation for Approval
for

Final

Settlement

Distribution

(R.444-446)

to

which

was

attached Exhibit A setting forth the attorney's fees of Conder &
Wangsgard incurred during the probate of the estate.

(R.447-452)

Co-Personal Representatives also filed an Inventory and Final
Accounting (R.456-460) and an Estate Recapitulation.

(R.461-462)

Appellant then filed a Petition to Surcharge Personal Representative Conder (R.464-479) and filed an Objection and an Amended
Objection to the Petition for Approval of Final Settlement and
Distribution.

(R.484-488;527-528)

Evidentiary hearings were

held on June 23, 1992 (R. 611-612 ;699-887) and on July 22, 1992
(R.628-629;1158-1223) and arguments of counsel were heard on
August 20, 1992 (R.638;1542-1571) resulting in Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Estate Closing Order.

(R.672-688)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about April 21, 1985 (Exh. 2, 6-14-91), Decedent
and Jerrald D. Conder of Conder & Wangsgard, hereafter Conder,
entered into an oral agreement whereby Conder and Wangsgard would
4

provide

legal

services

(R.967,968;1024,1025)

to

Decedent

for

$105

per

hour.

After legal services were commenced

for

Decedent on April 21, 1985, it became obvious that Decedent could
not pay for the legal services on a regular basis and Decedent,
who owned a construction company, would provide construction and
remodeling services to the Conder & Wangsgard office as payment
for legal services rendered.

(R.970,971;975, 976)

On May 27, 1990, the date of Decedent's death, plans
had been drawn for him to remodel the Conder & Wangsgard

law

offices which would provide cancellation of the amount incurred
for legal services (R.970,971;975,976). The remodeling was never
done due to the death of the Decedent.
On the night of the funeral, Conder organized a party
for

Decedent

at

the

Hidden

Valley

Country

Club

which

cost

$1,722.71 which Conder thought would be paid for by the estate of
Decedent.

(R.790-795; Exh. 9, 6-23-92)

Conder thought so much

of the service at the party that he left an additional
tip.

$50.00

(R.792)
On June 11, 1990, four days before he was appointed

Personal Representative, Conder entered

into an agreement with

Richard Marshall and Andy Johnson whereby they would continue to
work for Decedent's construction company on behalf of the estate
for an increased salary of $700.00 per week each and one-half of
all net profits earned until the final disposition of the business.

(Exh. 5, 6-14-91; R.971-973)
Decedent died intestate and his heirs were two minor

children,

Appellant

Dylon

C.

Husband,
5

age

17,

and

Lindsey

Husband, age 9.
divorced

wives

(R.2-5)
of

Ethyl Ashworth and Karen E. Husband,

Decedent,

were

the

parents

and

natural

guardians of Dylon C. Husband and Lindsey Husband, respectively,
and they petitioned the court on June 15, 1990 to have Conder
informally appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of
Decedent.

(R.2-5)
Conder failed to disclose to Ethyl Ashworth prior to

the execution of Renunciation of Right to Act as Personal Representative and Waiver of Bond (R.8) and Waiver of Notice (R.9)
that Conder & Wangsgard had a claim against the estate for
$20,000.00 in attorney's fees.

(R.910-912;1050,1051)

Conder was

informally appointed Personal Representative on June 15, 1990
(R.12-16) and published notice to creditors, the first publication being June 22, 1990 which set September 24, 1990 as the last
day for filing claims against the Decedent's estate.
Thereafter, among

other things, Conder

(R-17)
as Personal

Representative, deposited the estate funds in the non-interest
bearing Conder & Wangsgard Attorney Trust Account

(R.898-904)

which the trial court ordered at the hearing on January 15, 1991
placed in a separate interest bearing account (R.933); allowed
Decedent's girlfriend,

a client of Conder's

(1) to

live in

Decedent's house rent free until it was sold (R.797-801), (2) use
Decedent's Camareo IROC-Z from the date of his death for three
months putting 8,000 miles on the vehicle until it was turned
over to Appellant (R. 801-804 ;840-842; Exh. 14, 6-23-92), (3) to
keep furniture, which in all probability belonged to Decedent
(R.804-808), to keep a raft (R.808) and various items of camping
6

equipment (R.808-809-814); and gave a naugahyde couch and a set
of golf clubs to Decedent's brother (R.814).
On September 25, 1990, Appellant filed a petition to
remove Conder as Personal Representative and for an inventory and
accounting pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-3-611 based on the
foregoing and additional claims of mismanagement contained in the
petition (R.23-28) to which Conder filed an answer on October 10,
1990.

(R.32-44)
Conder filed and inventory and accounting on November

16, 1990 (R. 72-164) and on December 5, 1990 Appellant filed a
motion

requiring

Conder to

(1) to provide an

inventory and

accounting, P&L statements, and balance sheets on Decedent's
construction business and (2) a schedule of claims approved but
not paid and particularly the claim of Conder & Wangsgard for
attorney's fees.

(R.165-167)

1990 which

was

attended

delivered.

(R.920,921)

A hearing was set for December 17,

by

all

counsel

and

documents

were

The hearing on the Petition to Remove Conder as the
Personal Representative was held on January

15, 1991

(R.185)

which resulted in a Stipulation between Conder and his attorney,
the attorneys for Appellant and Lindsey Husband.

(R.190-193)

The Stipulation provided in part for the appointment of a CoPersonal Representative along with Conder for among other things
to approve or disapprove of the Conder & Wangsgard claim for
attorney's fees which claim for attorney's fees had to be further
approved by the court.

(R.191)

7

On May 16, 1991, Conder and his Co-Personal Representative petitioned

the court to sell Decedent's business, Chad

Husband Construction, Inc., to Richard Marshall and Andy Johnson
(R.199-247), which sale was approved by the trial court on June
14, 1991.

(R.273,274)

The sale was made and order entered over

the objection of Appellant's attorney "that the attorney's fees
claimed by Conder & Wangsgard should have been paid for by construction

and remodeling

services on the Conder

offices by Chad Husband Construction, Inc."

& Wangsgard

(R.273)

The claims of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's fees
incurred by Decedent prior to his death in the sum of $33,248.75
plus interest of $4,572.06 for a total of $37,820.81 was presented to the court by the Petition of K. C. Bennett of Conder &
Wangsgard, attorney for Personal Representative, on May 6, 1990.
(R.250-252)

Appellant filed a response to the Petition for

Attorney's Fees.

(R.269-272)

An evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of the
claim of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's fees on June 14, 1991
(R.275; 936-1059) after which the trial court directed that memoranda by the parties be filed.
Conder, as Personal Representative, filed a Memorandum
in Support of Petition for Claim which is the claim of Conder &
Wangsgard against the estate for attorney's fees incurred prior
to Decedent's death.

(R.279-308)

Appellant filed a Memorandum

and Amended Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for Approval of
Claim for Attorney's Fees.

(R.309-333;388-394)

8

A hearing was held on July 29, 1991 on the claim of
attorney's fees by Conder & Wangsgard but was continued in order
to obtain an expedited transcript of Conder's testimony on June
14, 1991 and a further hearing was to be held.

(R.335)

After the transcript of Conder's testimony on June 14,
1991 had been obtained
November 25, 1991.

(R. 1060-1157) , a hearing was held on

(R.366;1234-1406)

This resulted in the first

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated December 17,
1990 approving the claim of Conder & Wangsgard for $34,038.81.
(R.409-416)

A ten percent (10%) reduction ($3,781.90) off the

original claim for attorney's fees was allowed by the trial court
as the contractor's (Decedent's) profit for the construction and
remodel job to have been done at the Conder & Wangsgard offices.
(R.396-408)
Appellant filed a Motion for a New Trial (R.419) and a
Motion to Make New Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
altering or amending the Order accordingly (R.420) and a Memorandum in Support of the Motion.

(R.421-424)

Conder filed a Memo-

randum in Opposition to said motions (R.425-428) and a hearing
held on these on January 21, 1992.

(R.429;1307-1333)

The second Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order were entered
Wangsgard

on February

7, 1992 awarding

$34,038.81 on its claim.

(R.431-438)

Conder and
Co-Personal

Representatives filed a Petition for Approval of Final Settlement
and Distribution (R.439-443) together with a Schedule of Distribution

and

a

Stipulation

for Approval

for

Final

Settlement

Distribution (R.444-446) to which was attached Exhibit A setting
9

forth the attorney's fees of Conder & Wangsgard incurred during
the probate of the estate.

(R.447-452)

Co-Personal Representatives also filed an Inventory and
Final

Accounting

(R.461-462)

(R.456-460)

Appellant

and

then

an

filed

Estate

a

Recapitulation.

Petition

to

Surcharge

Personal Representative Conder (R.464-479) and filed an Objection
and an Amended Objection to the Petition for Approval of Final
Settlement and Distribution.

(R.484-488;527-528)

Evidentiary hearings were held on June 23, 1992 (R.611612;699-887)

and

on

July

22,

1992

(R. 628-629;1158-1223)

and

arguments of counsel were heard on August 20, 1992 (R.638;15421571)

resulting

in

Findings

Estate Closing Order.
The
distribution

Fact, Conclusions

Schedule

Conder

Personal Representative

&

of

Distribution

Wangsgard

of

attorney's

grounds

that

prosecuting

fees

and

proposed

the

Conder

fees

fees in the sum of $23,992.50

and

$11,500.00
the

Law

attorney's

plus $5,734.75 for paralegal fees (R.450).
the

of

(R.672-688)

original
to

of

Personal
of

these

& Wangsgard

fees were

claim

incurred by Decedent prior to his death.

(R.445)

Appellant challenged

Representative
said

and

fees

on

the

incurred

for attorney's

in

fees

(R.486,487;521)

The court finally ordered a reduction of $5,000.00 in
attorney's fees due Conder & Wangsgard that was incurred in connection with a probate of the estate that was attributable to the
prosecution of the Conder & Wangsgard claim for attorney's fees
incurred by Decedent prior to his death.
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(R.664;676,677)

Appellant's attorney filed his own claim and amended claim
for

attorney's

fees

(R.582-610)

and

was

attorney's fees and $213.60 as costs.

awarded

(R.680,685)

$1,000.00

as

The law firm

of Conder & Wangsgard received a total of $68,409.96 representing
the claim,

attorney's

and

Personal

Representative

fees

(which

were allowed at the same rate as attorney's fees) and paralegal
costs

out

of

an

estate

with

a

total

value

of

$155,784.83.

(R.437,438;459;683-688)
Appellant
Appellee

filed

Co-Personal

(R.696-697)

a Notice

of

Representatives

Appeal
filed

(R.691-692)
a

and

Cross-Appeal.

Lindsey Husband, one of the heirs of decedent, filed

a Cross-Appeal.

(R.694-695)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I

The claim of Conder & Wangsgard for $37,820.81 against
the estate for attorney's fees incurred by Decedent prior to his
death must be (1) in writing,

(2) show the basis therefor, (3)

the name and address of the claimant, (4) the amount claimed and
(5) must have been presented prior to September 24, 1990.
Conder and claimant on behalf of Conder and Wangsgard
must present a claim to Conder and Personal Representative to
comply with the Probate
same.

Code and, moreover, must

approve the

It is not sufficient that Conder as Personal Representa-

tive has knowledge

of the claim

of his

law

firm—it

must be

presented.
There was no formal claim presented but certain time
records were "put in the file."
11

The time records did not show

the full basis for the agreement between Decedent and Conder.
The name and address of Conder & Wangsgard are not on the writings put in the "file" and the clear weight of the evidence was
that the writings were not totaled until after September 24,
1990.

The

claim

of

Conder

& Wangsgard

for

the

aforesaid

attorneyfs fees was not legally sufficient and was not timely
filed.
POINT II
After

Conder's direct

and

cross-examination

covered

the

issues of the legal sufficiency of the Conder & Wangsgard claim
for attorney's fees and its timely filing and Conder further
testified on redirect covering the reasonableness of the fee and
a $15,000.00 credit and Appellant's attorney did not re-crossexamine it was abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
to allow Conder to testify on re-redirect about the same issues
he testified to on direct and cross examination.
POINT III
Conder's evidence was that $3,500.00 in attorney's fees
was incurred in presenting the claim of Conder & Wangsgard for
the attorney's fees incurred prior to Decedent's death.

Appel-

lant's evidence was that $11,550.00 was incurred in prosecuting
the said claim.

The trial court mysteriously found that $5,000

was the correct figure.
The clear weight of the evidence was that $11,550.00
was incurred by Conder as Personal Representative and he should
be surcharged $6,505.00 for this improper payment of attorney's
fees.
12

POINT IV
Conder as Personal Representative kept estate funds in
a

non-interest

bearing

account,

thereby

$1,357.30 in interest accumulations.

costing

the

estate

When this was called to the

attention of the trial court, it immediately ordered the estate
funds deposited in an interest bearing account.

Conder breached

his fiduciary duty to the estate and he should be surcharged for
the $1,357.30 interest not earned.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW THAT THE CONDER & WANGSGARD CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
AGAINST THE ESTATE IN THE SUM OF $37,820.81 WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT (75-3-804) AND TIMELY FILED (75-3-803).
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 (1975) provides in part as
follows:
75-3-803.
Limitation on presentation of
claims.—(1) All claims against a decedent's
estate which arose before the death of the
decedent, including claims of the state and
any subdivision of it, whether due or to
become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract,
tort, or other legal basis, if not barred
earlier by other statute of limitations, are
barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of
the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(a) Within three months after the date of
the first publication of notice to creditors
if notice is given in compliance with section
75-3-801; provided, claims barred by the
nonclaim statute at the decedent's domicile
before the first publication for claims in
this state are also barred in this state.

13

The case of Estate of Wlckham vs. Wickham, 670 P.2nd
452 (Colo.Ct.App. 1983) held that:
As provided in § 15-12-803, C.R.S. 1973 (1982
CumSupp. [78-3-803]), claims are barred unless presented within the time sent in a
proper notice of creditors.
This is the law, without exception, in all jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code.

Strong Bros.

Enters, vs. Estate of Strong, 666 P.2d 1109 (Colo.Ct.App. 1983).
It is submitted that this is the law in the State of
Utah based on the former Probate Code as set forth in Jones vs.
State Tax Comm. . 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210 (1940) at 104 P.2d
212:
In Clayton v. Dinwoodey, 33 Utah 251, 93 P.
723, 14 Ann.Cas. 926, we used this language:
"Mere knowledge on the part of the executor
or administration of the existence of a debt
* * * is not sufficient to dispense with the
necessity of presentation. * * * the defense
that the claim is barred by the statute of
limitations (nonclaim statute and not general
statutes of limitation) cannot be waived by
the executor or administrator."
The cases of Harris v. Turner, 96 Utah 342,
85 P. 2d 44 P. 2d 699, by implication support
this view. There is no conflict in the Utah
cases and our ruling that, after proper
notice, claims must be filed against an
estate within the time limited by statute or
said claims are forever barred is settled and
clear.
A Notice to Creditors was first published on June 22,
1990, which set September 24, 1990 as the last day for filing
claims against Decedentfs estate.

(R.17)

Thus, all claims must

be presented to Conder or his attorney or the Court on or before
September 24, 1990.

14

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-804 (1988) provides in part as
follows:
(1) Claims against a decedent's estate may
be presented as follows:
(a) The claimant may deliver or mail to
the personal representative, or the personal
representative's attorney of record, a written statement of the claim indicating its
basis, the name and address of the claimant,
and the amount claimed, or may file a written
statement of the claim, in the form prescribed by rule with the clerk of the court.
The claim is deemed presented on either the
receipt of the written statement of claim by
the personal representative or the personal
representative's attorney of record, or the
filing of the claim with the court, whichever
occurs first.
When the claimant and the Personal Representative are
one and the same person, the claimant must still present a claim
to. himself as Personal Representative.
Wickham,

supra,

the

personal

In Estate of Wickham v.

representative

of

the

Wickham

Estate, acting individually, prepared a claim against the estate
for reimbursement of property taxes, funeral and last illness
expenses and statutory allowances.

The claim was in writing and

was presented by the claimant individually to himself as Personal
Representative

of

the

Estate

for

approval.

The

claim

was

"allowed and approved" by the claimant acting as Personal Representative.

The trial court held that this did not constitute

presentation of the claim under Colorado's 3-804(1) of the Uniform Probate Code.

The Colorado Court of appeals reversed the

trial court and held that 670 P.2d 453 as follows:
Had the framers of the Colorado Probate Code
intended to provide a different method for
presentation of claims when the claimant and
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the personal representative are one and the
same person, they could have done so. They
did not. As written, § 15-12-804(1), C.R.S.
1973, provides that "a claimant ... may
deliver ... to the personal representative a
written statement of the claim ... The claim
is deemed presented on ... receipt of the
written statement of claim by the personal
representative ..." This provision was timely complied with here. Any exception for the
"two hat" situation at issue here must be
made by the general assembly and not the
courts.
In the case of Dementes v. Estate of Tallas 764 P.2d
628 (UtahCt.App. 1988), Dementes presented a timely written claim
against the Estate of Tallas which recited:
'...[t]he estate of the above named decedent
is indebted to the claimant in the amount of
$50,000.00. Such indebtedness is based upon
services
rendered
and
acknowledgment
by
deceased, that the $50,000.00 is due and
owing dated December 18, 1982.' Moreover, a
complete copy of the memorandum, in both
Greek and English, was attached to and incorporated by reference in the claim.
The Court of Appeals held at 764 P.2nd 630:
If a claim acquaints a personal representative with a specific amount allegedly due and
the general nature of the obligation, the
purpose of the statute has been satisfied.
Here, the claim was for $50,000.00 pursuant
to a document executed by the deceased, which
document was appended to the claim.
The
personal representative had all the information it needed to investigate the claim and
decide whether to pay it, fight it, or settle
it.
(Emphasis added)
In Quinn v. Ouinn 772 P.2nd 979 (UtahCt.App. 1989), the
claimant presented a timely written claim against the estate for
$650,000.00 and stated in detail the basis therefor.
Court of Appeals ruled as follows at 772 P.2nd 981:
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The Utah

We hold that Kip's claim was sufficient for
purposes of section 75-3-803 and section 753-804(1)(a) insofar as it gave Fenton fair
notice that the estate was facing a sizeable
tort claim, that the basis of the $650,000
claim was the death of Dawana at the hands of
Fenton Glade....
Thus, the claim of Conger & Wangsgard against Decedent's estate must

(1) be in writing,

(2) showing the basis

therefor, (3) the name and address of Conger & Wangsgard, (4) the
amount claimed, and (5) filed on or before September 24, 1990.
Findings of Fact by the Court
7.
On June 19, 1990 Jerrald D. Conder of
Conder & Wangsgard had in his possession the
time records of Jerrald D. Conder, Exhibit 3,
and Scott Wangsgard, Exhibit 1, showing the
date of service, the service performed and
the time required to perform the service.
Jerrald D. Conder placed Exhibits 1 and 3 in
the estate file of Decedent. Exhibits 1 and
3 were not totaled at this time. (R.433)
13. Conder & Wangsgard did not file a formal
claim against the estate showing the name and
address of the firm, the basis for the claim
and the amount claimed in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-804. (R.435)
Appellant does not dispute Findings of Fact 7 and 13 as
they are amply supported by the record.
9.
On August 31, 1991 Jerrald D. Conder
removed Exhibit 3 and had Exhibit 3 totaled
by his accounting staff and placed back in
the estate file. Exhibit 1 was not totaled.
The last seven pages of Exhibit 12 were
pulled from the Conder & Wangsgard files by
Jerrald D. Conder and placed in the estate
file. Jerrald D. Conder reviewed the files
and was satisfied that the work had been
performed as per the said exhibits. (R.4 34)
Finding of Fact 9 is important in that it showed the
totaling of Exhibits 3 and 12 prior to September 24, 1990 which
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it is submitted is a sine qua non to the legal sufficiency of any
claim filed against an estate under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-804
(1988) .
Evidence adduced to support Finding of Fact 9
up to and including the morning session of June 14, 1991.
A.
1990.

Conder considered the claim filed on August 31,

(R.951)
B.

Conder did not have the Conder and Wangsgard claim

totaled on August 31, 1990 but was aware of the "general sum of
money" "in rough form."
C.

(R.953)

Conder reviewed Exhibit 1 and other records and

probably asked "the girl" to prepare some kind of total but whether she did or not he wasn't clear.

He didn't know.

(R.958)

When Conder was asked about anything being totaled on August 31,
1990 he was "not exactly" sure and didn't remember.

(R.959).

At the close of the morning session, the trial court
summed up the evidence on the claim by saying, "There's no question that there's no claim filed, formal claim filed, on the date
that the last claims were to be filed.

No question about it.

Does anybody have any issues about that, formal claim as such
being filed?

Anybody have question about that?" (R. 1029)

Evidence adduced to support Finding of Fact 9
in the afternoon session of June 14, 1991.
Conder had completed his redirect examination at the
end of the morning session (R.1028) and Appellant had no recross
examination
re-redirect

(R.1030) and Conder was then allowed to testify on
examination

over

the

(R.1031)
18

objection

of

Appellant.

D.

Conder specifically remembered giving Exhibit 3 to

the accounting staff and the totals were entered on August 31,
1990 and Exhibit 3 was placed back in the file,
E.

(R.1032)

Conder took the last seven pages of Exhibit 12,

which apparently had already been prepared prior to August 31,
1990

and

inserted

them

in

the

"file" along

with

Exhibit

3.

(R.1033,1034)
F.

Conder knew the totals of the Conder & Wangsgard

claim against Decedent's estate to be $33,275.00 based on these
documents as of August 31, 190.

(R.1034)

Evidence adduced by Appellant showing Findings of Fact 9
to be against the clear weight of the evidence.
(A)

When Conder talked about putting the records in

the "file" to substantiate the claim

for Conder & Wangsgardfs

claim for attorney's fees on August 31, 1990, he was referring to
the time records, Exhibits 1 and 3, hearing of 6-14-91.

(R.950;

952;956)
(B)

No

exhibits

(C)

No

actual

were

totaled

on

August

31, 1990.

(R.953)
billing was

ever

totaled

or

sent

to

Appellant until after September 25, 1990, the date the Petition
to Remove was filed.
(D)

(R.956,957)

Exhibit 2, which is a typed version of Exhibit 3,

was not prepared until after the Petition to Remove was filed on
September 25, 1990.
(E)

(R.963)

The last seven pages of Exhibit 12 which is iden-

tical in format to Exhibit 2, and is the typed version of Exhibit
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1, was somehow in existence on August 31, 1990 and placed into
the file.

(R.1003)
(F)

delivered

to

The

last

seven

Appellant's

pages

attorney

of
until

Exhibit

12

December

were
18,

not

1990.

(R.999,1000;1033)
(G)
to

remove

things

On September 25, 1990, Appellant filed a Petition

Conder

the

as

Decedent

Personal
owed

Representative

Conger

&

for

Wangsgard

attorney's fees and had no documentation therefor.
(H)

among

other

$20,000.00

in

(R.2 3-28)

On October 8, 1990, Conder as Personal Representa-

tive filed an Answer to the Petition to Remove alleging among
other things:
Personal Representative specifically states
that he has disclosed to numerous parties
including Peter Guyon, Attorney for Conservator of decedent's other minor child, that
decedent was indebted to Personal Representative 's Law Firm in the amount of approximately $20,000.00. Personal Representative at no
time concealed or withheld any information
from petitioner and sets forth affirmatively
that Personal Representative does have documentation including time slips, work product
and other evidence of the $20,000.00 debt.
Personal Representative sets forth affirmatively that he has not made any arrangement
for decedent's construction company to perform work at his personal home in partial
satisfaction of the $20,000.00 debt. (emphasis added) (R.33)
(I)

On December 5, 1990, Appellant filed a Motion and

Notice of Hearing to be held on December 17, 1990, which Motion
among other things moved for an Order:
Requiring the Personal Representative to file
a complete schedule of all claims that have
been approved through the present time and a
schedule of all claims that have been
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approved but not paid and any and all claims
filed against the estate of Donald Chad
Husband and particularly the claim of the
Personal Representative and/or his law firm
for legal services rendered prior to the
death of the Decedent in the approximate sum
Of $20,000.00. (R.165-167)
(J)

Conder's affidavit stated that Exhibit 3 was not

prepared until shortly after his appointment as Personal Representative and that Exhibit

3 was not totaled until after the

Petition to Remove was filed on September 25, 1990.

(R.383,384;

1044-1048)
(K)

The claim

of Conder

& Wangsgard

for

attorney's

fees allegedly presented and approved for payment on August 31,
1990 (R.1041,1042), was not paid by Conder at this time (R.1043)
because there was too much money involved and he felt like someone might want to review it.
(L)

(R.1044)

On August 31, 1990, there was $67,763.09 on depos-

it in the Conder & Wangsgard trust account (Exh. 11, 6-14-91).
After the morning session and the "ruling" of the trial
court that no formal claim had been filed prior to September 24,
1990,

Conder

resumed

the

stand

in the

afternoon

session

and

changed his testimony to show the totaling of Exhibit 3 and the
last seven pages of Exhibit 12 on August 31, 1990.

He knew on

August 31, 1990 that the total Conder & Wangsgard claim according
to these documents was $33,275.00.
However, in Conder's Answer to the Petition to Remove
him

as Personal Representative

responded

filed

only as if the total claim

$20,000.00.

on October

10, 1990, he

for attorney's

fees was

The Answer claimed several times that Decedent owed
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Conder & Wangsgard $20,000.00 (Conder & Wangsgard had time slips
and other documentation showing the $20,000.00 debt; and denied
agreeing to the remodel of Conger's residence as payment of the
$20,000.00 in attorney's fee.)
Conder, as Personal Representative, with a fiduciary
duty to the estate and to Appellant should have disclosed in his
Answer that the claim was for $33,275.00 and had been approved
but not paid.
Also, if Conder had the accounting staff total Exhibit
3 on August 31, 1990, then why didn't he give Exhibit 1, which
was also in the file, to the accounting staff for totaling
instead of filing the last seven pages of Exhibit 12?
The clear weight of the evidence is that Exhibit 3 and
the last seven pages of Exhibit 12 of the June 14, 1991 hearing
were not totaled on August 31, 1990 and there was no totaling
until at least after October 10, 1990.
This is not the only flaw in the Conder & Wangsgard
claim for attorney's fees.

The only place on either Exhibit 3 or

the last seven pages of Exhibit 12 which show a basis for the
claim is page two of Exhibit 3 where there is a notation, "$105
per hr. per JDC."

Conder directed "someone" to put this on

Exhibit 3 which was not prepared until after June 19, 1990 or
totaled until after September 25, 1990 but he doesn't remember
when

it was

done.

(R.383,384;967,968)

There

is not one

scintilla or iota of evidence to support Finding of Fact No. 8
(R.434) and it is against the clear weight of the evidence.
$105 per hour is not the only basis for the claim.
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The

A modifica-

tion was made whereby the fee was to be paid by construction and
remodeling services on the Conder & Wangsgard law office and this
does not appear either on Exhibit 3 or the last seven pages of
Exhibit 12•
Exhibit 3 and the last seven pages of Exhibits 12 also
failed to have the name and address of Conder & Wangsgard as
further required by 75-3-804(1).

Conclusions of Law 2 and 3

(R.435,436) are primarily based on Findings of Fact No. 9, which
has been shown, it is submitted, is against the clear weight of
the evidence.

The Conclusion of Law based on Findings of Fact 9

must also fall and the order awarding Conder & Wangsgard must
also fall.

The claim of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's fees

incurred by Decedent prior to his death is not legally sufficient
under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-804 nor timely filed under Utah Code
Ann.

§ 75-3-803

and

the

order

$34,038.81 should be reversed.
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awarding

Conder

& Wangsgard

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RE-REDIRECT EXAMINATION
OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE CONDER AT THE JUNE 14, 1991 HEARING.
At the hearing on June 14, 1993 Conder testified on his
direct and cross-examination generally about the sufficiency and
timeliness of the filing of the claim of Conder & Wangsgard against
the Estate for $37,820.81.

(R. 949-1010)

Co-personal Representative was then called to testify
generally as to the reasonableness of the fees and an alleged
credit in the sum of $15,000.00.
Conder7s

attorney

(R. 1010-1019)

then

proceeded

with

redirect

examination of Conder covering the reasonableness of the fees
claimed and the $15,000.00 credit that had been brought up in the
direct examination of the Co-personal Representative.
1028)

(R. 1021-

Conder's attorney concluded his direct, cross-examination

and redirect examination by saying, "Submit it, your Honor."
1028)
The trial court then ruled at (R. 1029):
The Court: There's no question that there was
no claim filed, formal claim filed, on the
date that the last claims were to be filed.
No question about it.
Does anybody have any issue about that, formal
claim as such being filed? Anybody have any
question about that?
Mr. Abies: No.
The Court:

Okay.

You may be excused.

(Noon recess taken.)

24

(R.

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; FRIDAY, JUNE 14, 1993;
P.M.
P R O C E E D I N G S
The Court:
stand.

Mr. Conder, you may resume the

Mr. Abies, you can proceed with your crossexamination.
Mr. Abies:

No questions.

The Court:

Okay.

Mr. Abies:

No cross.

The Court:

You may call your next witness.

Mr. Bennett:
You Honor, that's the only
witness we have.
The Court:

Okay.

The witness:
moment ?
The Court:

So, you may step down.

May I speak with counsel for a

You may.

Mr. Bennett:

May I see Exhibits 3 and 4.

Mr. Abies: You Honor, I object to any further
examination. There were no questions asked.
There's no basis for him to redirect.
The Court:

Well, I'll allow it.

Mr. Abies:

Your Honor, I object.

The Court: You may object, but I'll got ahead
and allow it.
The trial court then allowed Conder to testify on reredirect covering the sufficiency and timeliness of filing of the
claim by Conder & Wangsgard for fees (R. 1030-1034) which had
already been covered in his direct and cross-examination. At the
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conclusion of Conder's re-redirect examination, the following
occurred at (R. 1034):
Mr. Bennett:
The Court:

That's all, your Honor.

Mr. Abies.

Mr. Abies: I object to that again and move to
strike.
He's just trying to correct his
testimony.
The Court:
redirect.

He has the right to do that on

Rule 611(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides as follows:
(a) Control by court.
The court shall
exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order
of
interrogating
witnesses
and
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for
the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid
needless consumption of time, and (3) protect
witnesses
from
harassment
or
undue
embarrassment.
There are no Utah cases decided under this Rule of
Evidence relating to redirect or re-redirect examination, but there
are older Utah cases in point.
In State v Cooper, 201 P.2d 764 (1949) the Utah Supreme
Court states as follows at 201 P.2d 768:
The real issue before us is whether the
testimony was properly admitted to rebut the
inference raised on cross-examination.
It
involves simply the question of the extent to
which counsel may be permitted to go in
redirect examination. It is the general rule,
of course, that the scope of redirect
examination is limited to the field covered in
cross-examination.
As a general rule any
evidence logically tending to rebut the
inferences raised in cross-examination is
admissible.
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The case of State v Holmes, 495 P.2d 312 (1972) held
that,

"....admission

of

testimony

on

redirect

examination

ordinarily is within the sound discretion of the trial court."
Conder's testimony on direct and cross-examination was
extensive and addressed the issues of the sufficiency of the claim
and the timeliness of filing in considerable detail.

The Court

concluded and made a ruling at the conclusion of the morning
session which was part of Finding of Fact 13 (R. 435) that there
was no formal claim filed.

(R. 1029)

Appellant's attorney did not recross-examine Conder on
the issue of the reasonableness of the fees or the $15,000.00
credit allegedly received.
been

the

limited

of

any

It is submitted that this would have
recross-examination

by

Appellant's

attorney.
Nevertheless, the trial court over the objection and
motion to strike by Appellant's attorney allowed Conder to change
his testimony on Exhibit 3 and the last seven pages of Exhibit 12
to show they had been totaled on August 31, 1990.
This is a clear abuse of discretion and a violation of
Rule 611(a)(1) and (2) in that it allowed Conder to change his
testimony after the court's ruling and was a needless waste of
time.
The case of Seaton v Wyo. Highway Com'n. Dist. 1, 784
P. 2d 197 (1989) is in point. Seaton was examined on direct, crossexamination,

redirect

examination

and

recross-examination.

Seaton's attorney then tried to have Seaton testify on re-redirect
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examination in order "to correct the misleading impression created
during cross-examination (emphasis added) that Riekens needed to
move three feet to avoid the curb."

The trial court would not

allow the re-redirect examination and Seaton appealed on the
grounds the trial court abused its discretion.
The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled as follows at 784 P. 2d
202:
The usual function of redirect examination is
to allow a party to explain testimony elicited
by an adversary's cross-examination, (citing
case)...Furthermore, W.R.E. 611(a) (U.R.E.
611(a) requires the trial court to exercise
reasonable control over the presentation of
evidence to avoid needless consumption of time
and to maintain efficiency and order in the
proceedings. In conjunction with W.R.E. 403
(U.R.E. 403), which permits the court to
exclude evidence for reasons of undue delay or
waste of time, or because the evidence is
cumulative or might confuse the jury, W.R.E.
611(a) vests the trial court with considerable
discretion.
(citing case) . . .A trial court
does not abuse its discretion with respect to
a decision concerning the manner of examining
witnesses if that decision was reasonable;
that is, if the trial court could reasonably
conclude as it did. (citing case)...Nor were
any new issues raised as to which she was
denied the opportunity for response....Even in
the second round, redirect examination is
discretionary, (citing authority) The unusual
circumstance where re-redirect examination
could be justified or even required within the
exercise of discretion by the trial court is
not presented here.
There was no recross-examination of Conder and his
redirect had been limited to reasonableness of the fees and the
$15,000.00 credit.
To allow him to testify on the sufficiency of the claim
and the timeliness of its filing was an abuse of discretion and a
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violation of the spirit and meaning of Rules 403 and 611, Utah
Rules of Evidence and the testimony of Conder on re-redirect
examination should be stricken and Point I of Appellant's argument
modified accordingly.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED
INSTEAD

OF

$11,550.00

IN

IN DETERMINING THAT ONLY $5,000.00
ATTORNEY'S

FEES

WERE

INCURRED

IN

PROSECUTING THE CLAIM OF CONDER & WANGSGARD FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
THE SUM OF $37,820.81.
Findings of Fact 10, 11 and 12 and Conclusion of Law 5
deal with the amount of attorney's fees Conder & Wangsgard claimed
as part of the administration of the Estate in prosecuting their
own claim for $37,820.81.

(R. 676, 677; 680)

Finding of Fact 11 contains the factual finding that
Appellant objects to.

Finding of Fact 11 provides:

11. The personal representatives and estate
incurred attorney's fees in the sum of
$5,000.00 in defending the recommendation of
the personal representatives that these fees
be paid. (R. 676)
Evidence adduced to support Finding of Fact 11.
A.

Conder filed an affidavit stating that the

total attorney's fees charged to the estate attributable to the
prosection of the claim for attorney's fees owed Conder & Wangsgard
as approximately $3,500.00.
B.

(R. 622)

No testimony was adduced as to the amount of

the Conder & Wangsgard estate fees attributable to the claim for
attorney's fees incurred prior to Decedent's death.
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Evidence adduced by Appellant that Finding of Fact 11 is
against the clear weight of the evidence.
(A)

Appellant

filed

and

argued

memoranda

and

documentation to the trial court at the hearing on August 20, 1992
(R. 1548) relating to Appellant's attorney's claim for attorney's
fees and the amount of time Appellant's attorneys spent defending
against the Conder & Wangsgard claim for attorney's fees (R. 582594) showing 95.3 hours (R. 1548).
(B)

Conder & Wangsgard spent a total of 110 hours

at $105.00 an hour or a total of $11,550.00 which was charged
against

the estate

for prosecuting

their claim of $37,820.81.

(Exhibit 1 and 2, 8-20-92; R. 649-663; 1548-1549; 1564-1565)
(C)

Appendix III sets for the date, service and

time involved in Appellant's attorney opposing the claim of Conder
& Wangsgard for attorney's fees.
(D)

Appendix IV sets forth the date, service and

time involved for the four attorneys of Conder & Wangsgard who
prosecuted their claim for attorney's fees.
(E)

Appendix IV is tied to the docket of the case.

(F)

The Conder & Wangsgard time is totaled and

(R. 656)

extending showing 110 hours at $150.00 per hour or a total of
$11,550.00 incurred in prosecuting the claim for $37,820.81.

(R.

657)
On September 24, 1992 the court made a minute entry
relating to these fees and ruled, "The court has concluded from the
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examination of records, affidavits, and from hearing testimony,
that the firm of Conder & Wangsgard had charged

the estate

$5,000.00 for fees, which were not chargeable for the probate of
the Chad Husband Estate."

(R. 664)

This was the basis for Finding of Fact 11 and there is no
clue as to the mental or reasoning process the trial court went
through in making its determination that $5,000.00 should be
deducted when a range was presented of $3,500.00 to $11,550.00.
This finding is against the clear weight of the evidence
which is amply shown by Appendices III and IV, and (R. 656, 657).
Conder as personal representative should be surcharged
$6,550.00 for fees improperly incurred and paid by the Estate.
POINT IV
THE

COURT

ERRED

IN

FAILING

TO

SURCHARGE

PERSONAL

REPRESENTATIVE CONDER FOR THE INTEREST NOT EARNED BY HIS FAILURE TO
DEPOSIT ESTATE FUNDS IN AN INTEREST BEARING ACCOUNT.
Finding of Fact 20 supporting the Estate Closing Order
found as follows:
20. In conjunction with the administration of
the estate, between May 24, 1990 and January
17, 1991, personal representative caused funds
of the estate to be placed in a non-interest
bearing account. Thereafter, by Court order,
the funds were deposited in an account bearing
interest at the rate of 5.25% per annum. (R.
678)
Finding of Fact 21 found as follows:
21. The deposits into trust by the personal
representative between the date of May 24,
1990 and January 17, 1991, was consistent with
personal representative's duties toward the
estate and a fair and reasonable disposition
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of those funds.
It was not necessary to
deposit these funds in an interest bearing
account. (R. 678)
Finding of Fact 21 is actually a Conclusion of Law in
that Conder fulfilled his duty to the estate by depositing the
estate funds in a non-interest bearing account. It should be noted
that there was no conclusion of Law relating to this issue.

(R.

679-681)
Conder as personal representative of decedent's estate
had a fiduciary duty as set forth in Utah code Ann. §75-3-703 which
provides as follows:
(1) A personal representative is a fiduciary
who has observe the standard of care
applicable to trustees as described by § 75-7302.
A personal representative is under a
duty to settle and distribute the estate of
the decedent in accordance with the terms of
any probated and effective will and this code
and as expeditiously and efficiently as is
consistent with the best interests of the
estate. He shall use the authority conferred
upon him by this code, the terms of the will,
if any, and any order in proceedings to which
he is party for the best interests of the
successors to the estate. (emphasis added)
The actual fiduciary duty is described in Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-7-302 as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by the terms of
the trust, the trustee shall observe the
standards in dealing with the trust assets
that would be observed by a prudent man
dealing with the property of another, and if
the trustee has special skills or is named
trustee on the basis of representations of
special skills or expertise, he is under a
duty to use those skills. (emphasis added)
Thus, Conder as personal representative is supposed to
deal with the assets of the estate in the same manner as would be
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observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another.
It is seriously doubted that a prudent man holding funds
for another in the approximate sum $67,000.00 would leave it in a
non-interest account when it could be put in an account drawing
5.25% interest.

Conder's failure to do this was a breach of his

fiduciary duty and not in the best interest of the estate as set
forth above.
This cost the estate the sum of $1,337.30 (Exhibit 11, 623-92) until the trial court, without any argument or objection
from Conder, ordered the immediate placement of estate funds in an
interest bearing account.

(R. 903, 904; 796-798)

In In Re. Listman's Estate, 197 P. 596 (1921) the Supreme
Court ruled at 197 P. 602:
The general rule, however, is that interest is
not chargeable, as a matter of course, against
an executor, but may be so charged if the
circumstances of a particular case require it.
To the same effect see In Re. Raleigh7s Estate, 158 P. 705 (1915).
The Listman case was decided in the days of bank failures
where there was no FDIC or other agency or means to protect
depositors.

There was also no probate code imposing a fiduciary

duty to do what is in the "best interest of the estate" and
defining the fiduciary duty insofar as dealing with the property of
the estate as a prudent man dealing with the property of another.
Moreover, Conder is liable to the estate for the interest
accrued from May 27, 1990 until the estate funds were deposited in
the interest bearing account based on the Utah Uniform Revised
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Principal and Income Act, Utah Code Ann. § 22-3-1 et seg. at 22-36(2) (b) .
This issue is of significant public interest and should
be decided by the Court as a guide to personal representatives,
bench and bar.
Conder should be surcharged $1,337.30.
CONCLUSION
The award of $34,038.81 made to Conder & Wangsgard for
their claim should be reversed.

Personal Representative Conder

should be surcharged $6,550.00 for improper attorney's fees and
$1,337.30 for interest not earned.
Respectfully submitted,

Wendell P. Abies
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ) 3 ^ day of October, 1993,
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief
were mailed, postage prepaid, to Scott R. Wangsgard, Attorney for
Appellee and Cross-Appellant Personal Representatives, 4059 South
4000 West, West Valley City, Utah 84120-4099 and to Peter W. Guyon,
Attorney for Cross-Appellant Lindsey Husband, 10 Exchange Place,
#614, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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APPENDIX I

Wendell P. Abies, #11
Attorney for Dylan Husband
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-7424
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

21 "7 acq

In The Matter of the Estate
ORDER

„.

.

.__
Cl/Vr

of
DONALD CHAD HUSBAND
Probate No.

903900669 ES

Deceased.
The Petition of Jerrald D. Conder, Personal Representative of the Estate of Donald Chad Husband, for approval of a
payment of attorney's fees to Conder & Wangsgard was heard by the
Honorable John A. Rokich, District Judge, on June 14, 1991, the
Personal Representative appearing and being represented by his
attorney, K.C. Bennett, and Objector Ethel Ashworth and Dylan
Husband,

an

heir, appearing

and

being

represented

by

their

attorney, Wendell P. Abies and Karen Husband, Conservator for
Lindsay Husband, an heir of Decedent, being represented by her
attorney Peter W. Guyon and the court having heard the testimony
of the witnesses and having received the exhibits into evidence,
and having considered the memoranda submitted by the parties and
having heard the arguments of counsel and after consideration and
review of the foregoing and having made a ruling from bench on
December 4, 1991 and the court being fully advised in the premises,
and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law;

00C537

WHEREFORE, it it hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. That Personal Representative is authorized to pay the
claim of Conder & Wangsgard in the sum of $34,038.81*
2. The defenses raised by Objector Ethel Ashworth of the
Statute of Limitations, the new claim limitation set forth in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3-803(2)(b), breach of contract, waiver, forfeiture,
failure of consideration, conflict of interest, breach of fiduciary
duty and statute of frauds are without merit and are hereby denied.
Dated this l i ^ d a y of Zamza&f-, 1992.

s[fJ— A

GJLJL

J0H& A. ROKICH
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

3 /-)T"day of January, 1992,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed, postage
prepaid, to K.C. Bennett, Attorney for Personal Representative,
4059 South 4000 West, West Valley City, Utah

84120-4099.
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APPENDIX I I

FftiO DISTRICT COURT
TNrdJwflcWDisW

OCT 19 032

Scott Ross Wangsgard #3376
Of and for CONDER & WANGSGARD
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
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sy-

Attorneys for Personal Representatives
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:

1

i

ESTATE CLOSING ORDER

DONALD CHAD HUSBAND,
1

Deceased.

I Probate No. 903900669 ES
i Judge John A. Rokich

Upon consideration of the Petition for Approval of Final
Settlement and Distribution filed by Jerrald D. Conder and John
Spencer Snow dated April 6, 1992, and the Petition to Surcharge
the Personal Representative, M l Objections Wt Amended Objections
to Petition for Approval of Final Settlement and Distribution,
having made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and

having

Accounting

considered
filed

by

the
the

Supplement
Personal

to

Inventory

and

Final

Representative,

the

Court

determines and finds that all required notices have been given or
waived and the estate has been administered according to the laws
of this state and the orders of this Court and should be closed.
THEREFORE,

000683

1.
hereby

The final account of the personal representatives is
approved;

the personal

representatives

are hereby

au-

thorized and directed to deliver and distribute title and possession of the assets of the estate to the distributees in the
amount and the manner set forth in the annexed Schedule of Distribution; upon making such delivery and distribution, and duly
filing receipts with this Court, the personal

representatives

shall be fully and finally released and discharged from their
trust, and together with any surety, shall be released and discharged from any bond and any and all liability arising in connection with the performance of their duties as personal representatives; and the administration of this estate shall be closed.
2.

The decedent died intestate.

The heirs of the decedent

and their respective interests in the decedent's estate are set
forth in the attached Determination of Heirship.
DATED this

/f day of

Oc^cb

*S

, 1992.

BY THE COURT:
/
/\

<L

A. ROKICH
rd District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Wendell Abies
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SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION ANNEXED TO ESTATE CLOSING ORDER
Name
of Distributee

Distribution
Value

Description of
Property Distributed
PRIOR DISBURSEMENTS

Dylon Husband

Dylon Husband
Dylon Husband
Dylon Husband

1988 Camaro $12,500.00
debt
($ 8,559.71)
net

$ 3,940.29

misc items of personalty
1950 Harley Davidson
Cash

750.00
$
$ 6,000.00
$ 5,600.00
$16,290.29

Total Dylon Husband

Lindsay Husband
Lindsay Husband
Lindsay Husband

i Hidden Valley wake
misc items of personalty
1975 Corvette

886.10
$
750.00
$
$ 6,000.00
$ 7,636.10

Total Lindsay Husband

DISTRIBUTION
ASSETS
Cash in trust account

$63,796.97

FINAL DISTRIBUTION
Dylon Husband
Lindsay Husband
Atty. fees/PR fees due Conder & Wangsgard *
PR fees due John S. Snow
Atty. fees & costs awarded Wendell Abies
Karen/Lindsay Husband support claim
Estimated final estate closing costs **

$ 9,973.99
$18,628.18
$27,136.40
$
795.00
$ 1,213.40
$ 4,550.00
$ 1,500.00

Total

$63,796.97

0U0655

Misc items including tools, furnishings, sports
equipment held in storage:
Lindsay Husband

1/2 undivided
interest

Dylon Husband

1/2 undivided
interest

*
This amount is equal to the billings of Conder & Wangsgard
less a $5,000,00 deduction ordered regarding the claim of prior
attorney's fees due Conder & Wangsgard less $886.10 representing \
of the cost of decedent's wake held at Hidden Valley Country Club.
**
Personal Representative and attorney's fees for drafting of
closing documents, misc. estate expenses, e.g. billings for
storage, will be paid from this amount; income by way of interest
accumulations and any remaining sums will be divided equally
between Dylon and Lindsay Husband.
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APPENDIX III

APPENDIX III
Date
(R. 587)
03-08-91

(R. 588)
05-06-91

05-06-91

05-07-91
05-07-91

(R. 589)
05-08-91

05-09-91

Service

Time

Travel to West Valley City Building
Permits Department. Travel to the Salt
Lake County Building Permits Department.
Assessment made to see if construction
performed on Conder & Wangsgard office.
Telephone to Bob Maxfield regarding the
12-31-90 financial condition of Chad
Husband Construction.

2.0

Preparation and dictation of Abies
Affidavit. Travel to court to get orders
from the court.
Preparation and
dictation of Objections to Hearing on May
9, 1991 and FAXED notice to attorneys and
travel to court to file.

2.0

Research and dictation of the balance of
the Dylan Husband Affidavit, Ethel
Ashworth Affidavit and Objection to
Hearing.

1.2

Preparation and dictation of the balance
of the Abies Affidavit.

1.5

Telephone to Dylan Husband. Telephone to
K.C. Bennett. Telephone to Melba. Proof
the deposition notes and rough in
argument.

1.0

Telephone to Ethel Ashworth and Dylan.
Preparation of affidavits, preparation
and dictation of Request for Production
of Documents and Objections and send the
same.
Travel to court. Telephone to
Melba. Conference with Dylan and Ethel
and telephone conference with Melba
regarding hearing in June.

1.6

Telephone conference with John Spencer
Snow and with Kirk Bennett. Telephone
conference
with Melba.
Telephone
conference with K.C. Bennett and John
Spencer Snow and left message for John
Spencer Snow. Preparation and dictation
of notice of hearing.
Telephone to
Guyon. Telephone to John Spencer Snow

and travel to Guyon's office to deliver
papers.
05-10-91

1.4

Prepare for conference call. Conference
call between Judge, K.C. Bennett, Abies,
Guyon and possibly Conder. Preparation
and dictation of Notice and preparation
of Order. Travel to Conder office and
conference with Kirk Bennett. Telephone
conference with Kirk Bennett regarding
Wangsgard time slips.
Telephone to
2.3

05-15-91
05-16-91

05-17-91

05-20-91
05-21-91

(R. 590)
05-22-91

05-23-91
05-24-91
06-05-91

Preparation and dictation of Objections
and FAX to parties.

.4

Preparation for hearing and preparation
of exhibits. Travel to court, appearance
in chambers, telephone to reporter and
telephone to Conder's secretary.

2.0

Telephone to Linda, telephone to Wendy
and preparation and dictation of Notice
of Deposition.

.4

Preparation for deposition and second
deposition of Conder.

3.0

Telephone conference with Kirk Bennett
and Kathy Schultz. Research on law at U
law library. Research on law in office.
Preparation and dictation of objections
to the payment of attorney's fees to
Conder & Wangsgard.

2.0

Telephone conference with Peter Guyon, he
remembers the delivery of the claim of
fees to me on December 17, 1990. There
was no mention of Wangsgard fees for
$10,000.

.3

Preparation and dictation of Response and
correction to Order.

2.0

Subpoena for Conder.
for Marshall.

Prepare Subpoena

Telephone conference with Joe Rhodes, a
licensed contractor and a licensed
engineer, $700 per week and one-half of
net profit, excessive. Telephone call
from K.C. Bennett.
Preparation and
dictation of Subpoenas.

.4

.7

06-10-91
06-11-91

06-12-91

06-12-91
06-13-91
06-14-91

07-01-91
07-11-91
(R. 591)
07-12-91
07-12-91

07-14-91
07-15-91
07-29-91

11-14-91
11-21-91

Assemble Subpoenas, travel to court to
have delivered to constable for service.

.5

Research on law and cases of statutoryprovisions and go through file and
separate and prepare for trial.

2.0

Travel to law library and research.
Travel to Secretary of State for writ and
proprietorship information.

2.0

Travel to Secretary of State's office to
do research on the law.

2.5

Research and preparation for trial,
telephone conference with K.C. Bennett.

8.0

Preparation for trial, conference with
clients and presentation of trial,
research and conclusion of trial.

8.7

Preparation and dictation of letter and
hand deliver the same.

.4

Travel to court to get copies of exhibits
and dates from the record.

.6

Research, preparation and dictation of
facts and into Point I of brief.

3.5

Travel to court, research, preparation
and dictation of the balance of Point I
of brief and read deposition.

1.0

Research and hand draft the entire
memorandum after the factual statement.

10.0

Preparation and dictation of brief on
machine. Mailed to counsel.

2.0

Preparation, travel and appearance before
the court. Hearing held from 11:05 to
11:30 and hearing stopped by the court.
Transcript of Conder's testimony to be
prepared by reporter.

2.5

Telephone conference with Kirk Bennett.
Preparation and dictation of Objection.

.5

Review the deposition in detail. Only
consists of the AM testimony. Telephone
conference with Kathy Schultz and she
said she would check. Telephone to Kathy

Schultz, she will do the current project
and pull up the Conder testimony and if
it is short, she will complete it.
22-91

Telephone call from Kathy Schultz is
getting the transcript ready and will
call me.

24-91

Review the deposition in its entirety.
Travel to obtain a second copy. Continue
on the deposition.

25-91

Check deposition and preparation
memorandums based on the deposition.

25-91

Preparation for hearing, research, a
conference with clients and attendance at
hearing before the court.

592)
26-91

of

Check depositions and transcript for
reference
to
exhibits
therein.
Preparation and dictation of letter to
Judge Rokich and delivered to Judge and
FAXED to Conder and Snow.

04-91

Travel to court for hearing and back to
office.

10-91

Check Conder Affidavit and telephone to
several contractors.
Telephone with
Hogan,
Brubaker,
Lee
and Bowmann.
Preparation
and
dictation
of
documentation.

12-91

Telephone calls to the various affiants,
preparation and dictation of three
affidavits and letter to Judge and
deliver letters and affidavits to court.

13-91

Preparation and dictation of letter.

16-91

Make copies of affidavits and travel to
court for Judge Rokich's box. Mail to
Conder.

27-91

Preparation and dictation of Notices,
memo and travel to court to file and mail
for service.

15-92

Conference with Ethel Ashworth, Steve
Ashworth and Dylan Husband regarding the
problem of the attorney's fees and the
surcharge and the final accounting.

01-17-92

01-21-92

01-31-92

Preparation for hearing and travel to
court and wait for small conference with
Judge Rokich.

1.5

Research and preparation for hearing,
travel to court. Court orders to file,
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Order.

1.8

Preparation and dictation of Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law by Abies.

2.0

APPENDIX IV

APPENDIX IV
Date
(R. 651)
02-23-91

Service

Time

Conder
t/c w/Rick Cuatto re: Abies Phone call
re: attorney's fees

.25

05-20-91

Deposition of Jerry Conder

1.0

06-06-91

Review motion re: Wendell; meet with Kirk

06-13-91

Prepare for hearing

1.5

06-14-91

Trial Time

6.0

11-25-91

Hearing

5.0

12-5-91

Conference w/KCB

1.0

(R. 652)
06-11-91

Wangsgard
Prepare documents for hearing; court K.B.
and Marshall

1.5

.75

06-13-91

Draft Affidavit

12-06-91

Draft Findings of Fact & Conclusions of
Law; conference w/P.R.

2.0

Bennett
Hearing, t/c w/Opposing counsel; review
documents

1.75

Prepare Documents; Review Documents;
legal research; phone conference

3.0

(R. 653)
05-09-91
05-10-91
05-15-91

Phone

Conference;

.5

preparation

for

hearing; t/c w/counsel

3.0

05-16-91

Hearing & Travel

2.5

05-17-91

Prepare Order; phone conference

1.75

06-06-91

Prepare for hearing & prepare affidavits

4.0

06-07-91

Prepare documents; prepare hearing

2.5

06-10-91

Review documents; prepare hearing

.5

06-11-91

Prepare documents for hearing; office
conference w/witness

2.0

06-12-91

Deliver documents; prepare hearing

06-13-91

Prepare

for

hearing;

legal

3.0

research

prepare documents

5.0

06-14-91

Trial

6.0

06-17-91

Legal Research

3.0

06-18-91

Legal Research

2.0

06-20-91

Legal Research

1.0

06-21-91

Legal Research

2.5

06-22-91

Legal Research & Draft Memorandum

1.0

06-22-91

Legal Research & Draft Documents

2.0

06-24-91

Legal Research

3.0

07-23-91

Draft Findings

1,0

07-25-91

Legal Research

1.0

07-26-91

Prepare findings & Legal Research

1.0

07-29-91

Prepare for hearing

3.5

11-12-91

Review Transcript

2.5

01-06-92

Review & draft response

1.0

01-19-92

Travel & conf w/Judge

2.0

01-21-92
(R. 654)
06-19-91

Travel & conference & Hearing
Rognlie
Research at Library

2.5

06-28-91

Edit and proofread memorandum re: claim
for attorney's fees

(R. 654)

(R. 655)
01-03-92

1.0
2.0
.25

Research

